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Judicial Interference With Effective
Advocacy by the Defense
Bennett L. Gershman*
A fundamental premise of the American criminal justice system
is defense counsel's zealous professional advocacy. Representation of a
criminal defendant to be effective must be vigorous. In administering a
trial, judges have a duty to ensure a fair and orderly proceeding. On
occasion, however, judges overstep the line and impede defense counsel's
advocacy functions unfairly. This article describes some of the ways
that trial judges may violate legal and ethical standards by improperly
interfering with defense counsel's courtroomfunctions.

A cornerstone of the criminal justice system is the ability of defense counsel to advocate his or her case effectively. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance
of counsel. 1 Interference by the trial judge in the advocacy functions of
defense counsel can undermine this fundamental constitutional right or
otherwise deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The proper role of a trial
judge is one of impartiality in demeanor as well as in actions. 2 Ajudge's
mistreatment of defense counsel, or impairment of counsel's ability to
represent a client effectively, can violate ethical standards,3 as well as
provide grounds for reversal.
CritiCism, Abuse, and Threats

Trial judges must display patience, courtesy, and respect toward
counsel so as not to prejudice counsel's client or give the jury an impression of partisanship.4 Judges, however, are only human, and the

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York.
Many of the ideas in this article are discussed in my forthcoming book, "Trial Error
and Misconduct" (The Michie Company, 1997).
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963). Civil litigants also have a right to be
represented by retained counsel. See Anderson v. Sheppard, 856 F2d 790, 794 (6th
Cir. 1988); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F2d 1101, 1117 (5th Cir. 1980).
United States v. Frazier, 584 F2d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 1978).
See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-1.1 (2d ed. 1986) (judge's conduct
toward counsel should manifest professional respect, courtesy, and fairness); 6-2.4 (judge
should respect obligation of counsel to present objections, make offers of proof, and to
make a record); 6-2.5 (judge should respect attorney-client relationship).
4 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 403-404 (2d Cir. 1985); OgJen v. State,
440 So. 2d 1172, 1174-1175 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); People v. Dejesus, 369 NE2d
2

3

424

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

pressures of a trial, or the conduct of an attorney, "can on occasion
cause even the most imperturbable judge to vent irritation or impatience that ideally should be suppressed."5 Nevertheless, depending on
the nature of the remarks and the circumstances under which they are
made, a judge's disparagement of counsel may so undermine the
attorney's effectiveness that it prejudices the jury against the client. 6
Disparaging remarks made in the jury's presence are potentially the
most damaging. However, even disparaging remarks made outside the
presence of the jury can be seriously prejudicial to the extent that such
remarks unnerve and demoralize counsel and impede counsel's effectiveness. 7 Moreover, apart from appellate rebuke, abusive and intemperate remarks can also result in disciplinary action. 8
Remarks that impugn counsel's integrity are a striking example of
misconduct. 9 A federal conviction was reversed when the judge admonished defense counsel in front of the j ury: "I won't let you tell them
rotten law." 10 Another federal judge interrupted counsel's closing argument to advise the jury that counsel's assertion was "absurd and bordering upon a lie," and that "counsel won't get away with it."ll Clearly,
such reprimands, even if warranted, should be made outside the jury's
presence. As one court observed, "The judge's castigation of counsel
752, 755 (NY 1977). See also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(4)
(1990).
5 United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973).
U.S. v. Donato, 99 F3d 426, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (trial judge's constant criticism of defense counsel denied defendant a fair trial); United States v. Cassiagnol,
420 F2d 868, 879 (4th eir. 1970) ("constant or persistent interruption of defense
counsel may have the effect of contaminating the jury's verdict by indicating the
judge's evaluation of the weight of the evidence and the merits of the defense").
7 United States v. Robinson, 635 F2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. J9 0) ("a trial judge's
improper remarks to counsel outside of the jury's presence may unnerve an attorney
and make il difficult for nim to serve his client to the full extent of his ability"):
Wruberg v. Israel. 766 F2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985) (accusing attorney of ingratitude and
remioding him of his dependence on judge's goodwill may have caused counsel to
"pull his punches"); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1979) (judge's
"clumsy effort at comedy" by engaging in hoax with prosecutor and pretending that
case was going to be reopened was in "poor taste" and reflected "astonishingly bad
judgment" but did not prejudice defense counsel's ability to function); Oglen, 440
So. 2d at 1172, 1174 (judge displayed unprofessional conduct during in-chambers
conference, but jury "shielded" from prejudicial remarks).
gIn re Waltemede, 409 NYS2d 989 (NY App. Div. 1975) (judge censured, in part,
for unjustifiable criticism of public defenders).
9 Derden v. McNeel, 938 F2d 605,611 (5th Cir. 1991).
6

United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Spears, 558 F2d 1296, 1297 (7th Cir. 1977) (trial judge's "devastating" remark was not only improper, it was also erroneous).
10

11
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so discredited him in the eyes of the jury that he could not have remained an effective spokesman for his client."'2 Similarly, after an attorney stated to the judge, "I'm sure the court does not mean to criticize my
trial tactics in front of the jury," the judge responded: "I do. I think you sat
there and sandbagged us to be frank about it, and I think the jury and I are
entitled to know why."'3 Equally reprehensible are remarks accusing counsel of "throwing up smoke screens,"14 "pulling a filibuster,"'5 "playing
games," or "putting words in the witness's mouth."'6
Ajudge's remarks may also impugn counsel's competence. Ajudge
occasionally may find it necessary to admonish an attorney to ask proper
questions, not to be repetitive, and to adhere to proper rules of courtroom decorum. Although such remarks are permissible, stern corrective action ordinarily should be taken outside the presence of the jury. 17
Gratuitous reproaches about counsel's ineptness in the jury's presence
can throw counsel off balance and impair counsel's effectiveness.
For example, in a highly publicized trial, 18 the judge in the jury's
presence repeatedly criticized defense counsel's competence by remarks
such as: "I haven't any right in a public trial to give you a course in
evidence;" "You will have to see a lawyer if you don't understand [my
ruling];" "I don't know about a defense, but you are doing some conducting." Similarly degrading were another judge's remarks admonishing defense counsel to "sit down and let the other attorney take over if
you don't know how to cross-examine this man," "Your tactics are not
correct," and "You are going at it in a very awkward way. Let's do it in
the right way."19
12Id. at 1298. See also United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F2d 302, 311 (2d Cir. 1973)
(prejudice from "numerous acrimonjous exchanges with defense counsel many of
which occurred in the presence of the jury"). See als Etzel v. Ro enbloom, 189 P2d
848,850 (Cal. 1948) (judge tells counsel be will sustain objection "if [counsel] does
not want the jury to know the truth about thal").
13 Spencer v. State, 543 A2d 851, 854 (Md. App. 1988) (appellate court noted tbat
defense counsel did not engage in unethical conduct; had requested to be heard at the
bench severa) times concerning the subject of the judge's rebuke, but the request was
denied).
14 United States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1089 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987).
IS State v. Hammier, 312 So. 2d 306, 314 (La. 1975).
16

People v. Dejesus, 369 NE2d 752, 754 (NY 1977).

17 Spears, 558 F2d at 1296, 1298; United States v. Gomez, 529 F2d 412, 419 (5th
Cir. 1976).

United States v. Dellinger, 472 F2d 340, 387-388 ns. 83, 84 (7th Cir. 1972).
Bursten v. United States, 395 F2d 976, 983- 987 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Pau v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F2d 880, 885 (9th CiL t 991) (judge states: "Counsel, I didn't realize I bad to conduct a law school class. but I guess I do.").
18

19
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Accusing counsel of being asleep, and suggesting sarcastically that
somebody was using ventriloquism to make counsel's statements for
him or her;20 rebuking counsel for asking "absurd questions,"2J for "foolishness,"22 or for failing to comply with the court's procedures 23 , or
other denigrating comments frequently contributes to appellate reversal,24 Moreover, harsh rebukes even outside the jury's presence, such as
accu~ing counsel of "disgusting and shysterlike" behavior, can create
"an embattled and prejudicial atmosphere in the courtroom that makes
a fair trial impossible."25
Finally, threatening counsel in the presence of the jury can be serious misconduct. A federal conviction for attempted extortion was reversed when the trial judge threatened to send defense counsel to jail if
he made any argument relating to the victim's fear.26 Equally improper
was threatening defense counsel with having to take the stand and respond to questions of the prosecutorY Citing a lawyer for contempt in
the presence of the jury is improper.28 Factors that are considered in
determining whether threatening or other heavy-handed remarks by the
judge require reversal include whether the jury heard the remarks,29
People v. Zammora, 152 P2d 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
21 United States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1088 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987).
22 McAllister v. State, 178 SW2d 67, 69 (Ark. 1944).
23 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637, 640 (5th Cir. 1976) Gudge accused counsel of trying to take advantage of the court by requesting a brief continuance to produce an expert witness).
24 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 403-404 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing judge's
"unnecessary barbs" at counsel that were made with "distressing frequency"); People
v. Pressley, 513 NE2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) Gudge raises objection to counsel's
question on own motion and then grants it); People v. Johns, 415 NYS2d 71 (NY
App. Div. 1979) (antagonistic and disparaging attitude toward manner in which counsel conducted himself).
25 United States v. Boatner, 478 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1973). See also In re Cooper, 821 F2d 833, 839 (1st Cir. 1987) ("occasionally exceptional circumstances do
arise where ajudge's attitude toward a particular attorney is so hostile that the judge's
impartiality toward the client may reasonably be questioned").
26 United States v. Kastenbaum, 613 F2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1980).
27 United States v. Beaty, 722 F2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983). See also United
States v. DiPaolo, 804 F2d 225,232 (2d Cir. 1986) (threatening defense lawyer with
jail if he cross-examined government witness about where he was presently living).
28 United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F2d 1002, 1008 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1089-1090 (5th Cir. 1987).
29 United States v. DiPaola, 804 F2d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 404 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Block, 755 F2d 770, 776
(lIth Cir. 1985); United States v. Beaty, 722 F2d 1090, 1093-1094 (3d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Boatner, 478 F2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1973); People v. Harbolt, 253
20

427

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

whether the remarks were provoked by counsel, 30 whether the remarks
were isolated or repeated,3l the length of the trial,32 the evenhandedness
of the judge's behavior toward the defense and the prosecution,33 the
presence and effect of curative instructions,34 and the strength of the
evidence. 35
Threats to counsel made outside the jury's presence also can result
in a deprivation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. For
example, a constitutional violation of the right to counsel was found
when the judge chastised a court-appointed defense lawyer for ingratitude, and "made a thinly veiled threat not to approve [counsel's] fee
request at the end of the irial."36

Interference with Counsel's Representational Functions
Even absent outright threats, ridicule, or abuse, a court can so interfere with defense counsel's representational functions that it destroys
the defendant's right to a fair trial and the effective assistance of his or
her attorney. When the judge's interference is sufficiently pronounced
that the judge is claimed to have displayed an appearance of bias against
the defendant, appellate courts review the claim de novo to determine
whether the conduct communicated to the jury a predisposition against the
defendant who was thus denied a fair trial. 37 When the judge's interference
is challenged as error and the subject matter of the ruling allows the judge
room to exercise discretion (as do virtually all rulings on evidence and

Cal. Rptr. 390,401 (1988); Olgen v. State, 440 So. 2d 1172, 1174 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983).
30 Beaty, 722 F2d at 1090, 1094 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F2d
317, 320(6thCir. 1983); United States v. Robinson, 635 F2d 981, 985 (2dCir. 1980).
31 United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F3d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1089 (5th Cir. 1987).
32 Compare United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931 (6lh Cir. 1979) (one-day trial),
with United States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1987) (eight- week trial), and
United States v. Beaty, 722 F2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1983) (lwo-week trial).
33 Compare United States v. Tilton, 714 F2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1983) (intrusions
evenly felt by both sides), with Beaty, 722 F2d at 1090, 1095 (disparate treatment),
and United States v. Boatner, 478 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1973) (same).
34 Okoronkwo, 46 F3d at 426, 436; Boatner, 478 F2d at 737,741; People v. Harbolt,
253 Cal. Rptr. 390,401 (1988).
35 Beaty, 722 F2d at 1090, 1095; Boatner, 478 F2d at 737, 742.
36 WaIIberg v. Israel, 766 F2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985).
37 United States v. Bermea, 30 F3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir. 1994).
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procedure), appellate courts typically accord the trial judge very broad deference and find error only if that discretion is clearly abused.
Rulings on Objections and Motions

A judge should allow counsel the opportunity to state objections,
request rulings, and make a record to describe the judge's conduct that
counsel considers improper and prejudiciaps A judge's refusal to allow counsel to object or make a record may compound the prejudice
resulting from any impropriety by preventing counsel from attempting
to limit the impact of the judge's conduct. 39 Although a numerical tally
of the judge's rulings favoring one side or against the other side ordinarily is not the test of unfairness,4o such measurement can be an indication of ajudge's lack of neutrality.41
For example, in United States v. Dellinger,42 the well-known trial of
the "Chicago Seven," the judge's rulings were most often adverse to
the defense, and suggested "hostility" and "contempt" for the defendants. The judge deliberately tried to frustrate the defense's ability to
present its extensive case by restricting the attorneys' ability to interview witnesses, extending afternoon sessions when the defense case
began, and then announcing for the first time during a late Friday afternoon session, after the defense ran out of witnesses, that the trial would
continue on Saturdays. In another case, partisanship also was demonstrated when a judge refused to allow defense counsel to reserve making an opening statement until after the government had presented its
case,43 and systematically interrupted defense witnesses or defense counsel sua sponte with the words "objection sustained."44 As one appellate
panel observed, "It apparently never occurred to the district judge to
either wait for an objection, or to call counsel up before him out of the

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-2.4 (2d ed. 1986).
39 United States v. Moorehead, 57 F3d 875 (9th Cir. 1995); People v. Mato, 633
NE2d 446 (NY 1994). The practice of holding unrecorded bench conferences on
trial motions is disapproved. See State v. Fletcher. 717 P2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1986).
40 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1985).
38

41 United States v. Dellinger, 472 F2d 340, 387 (7th Cir. 1972) Uudge more likely
to rule against defense than against government).
42 Dellinger, 472 F2d at 340.

43

United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931,934 (6th Cir. 1979).

44 Crandell v. United States. 703 F2d 74, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1983); Hickman, 592
F2d at 934; People v. Pressley, 513 NE2d 921, 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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hearing of the jury and admonish them if they were misbehaving or
bungling an examination of a witness."45
Determining whether such interference displays an appearance of
partiality or is appropriately related to efficient trial management depends on a careful review of the facts. For example, a trial of multiple
defendants, or a lengthy or complex trial, may allow more room for
judicial involvement to prevent repetition and confusion. 46 Refusing to
allow counsel to make an offer of proof as to the correctness of his or
her position ordinarily is improperY Ruling on a motion for acquittal
in the jury's presence is also improper. 48 Counsel's objections on matters of law typically should be made outside the jury's presence to prevent any suggestion of antagonism between counsel and the judge.
Therefore, denying counsel the opportunity to make objections to jury
instructions outside the jury's presence is error,49 and may even consti~
tute reversible error. 50
Some rulings that hamper counsel's ability to make objections, such
as requiring counsel to write out objections, or denying sidebar conferences, are problematic, but may be allowed when the ruling appears to
be a reasonable measure to expedite the examination of witnesses, and
no prejudice is shown. 51 A court has considerable latitude in deciding
whether an evidentiary hearing should be granted. Denying an
evidentiary hearing on a motion is error only if there are factual disputes that, ifresolved in the defendant's favor, would entitle him or her
to the requested relief. 52

4' Hickman, 592 F2d at 934. See also People v. Ashwal, 347 NE2d 564 (NY 1975)
(judge's repeated overruling of proper defense objections during prosecutor's summation enhances the possibility of prejudice by "giving standing to the statement of
the District Attorney as legitimate argument").
46 United States v. Bermea, 30 F3d 1539, 1570-1571 (5th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Manko, 979 F2d 900 (2d Cir. 1992).
47 People v. Eckert, 551 NE2d 820, 822-824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Pressley, 513
NE2d at 921,926.
48 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637,641 (5th Cir. 1976).
49 Hamling v. United States, 418 US 87 (1974) (con truing Fed. R. Crim. P. 30).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. The rule is "designed t avoid the subtle psychological
pressures upon the jurors which would arise.if they were to view and hear defense
counsel in a posture of antagonism toward the judge." Hamling, upra at 134.
50 United States v. Sloan, 811 F2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Salinas,
601 F2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1979).
51 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 402--403 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring written
objections); United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F3d 415 (8th Cir. 1993) (disallowing
sidebar conferences).
52 United States v. Staula, 80 F3d 596, 603 (1st Cir. 1996).
430

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

Limiting Argument of Counsel

A trial judge has broad discretion over the subject matter of closing
argument, and the amount of time allotted to counsel for making closing argument, and error will be found only ifthat discretion is abused. 53
Although ajudge has an obligation to use judicial time efficiently,54 an
undue emphasis on speed can deprive a defendant of a fair trial and the
effective assistance of counsel. 55 Although counsel is not allowed to
filibuster, he or she must be given sufficient time to fully and completely present argument to the jury. 56 Imposing unreasonable time limits on counsel's closing argument may be an abuse of discretion,57 as
well as an interference with counsel's ability to develop plausible legal
arguments supported by the facts. 58
Important factors bearing on the appropriateness of the judge's time
limitations are length and complexity of the trial, severity of the charges,
number of defendants, number of witnesses, and possible punishment.
Thus, a 30-minute limitation on counsel's closing argument in a murder case was found to have unreasonably deprived the defendant of a
fair triaP9 The trial was complex, and the restriction severely impeded

53 United States v. Moye, 951 F2d 59 (5th Cir. 1992) (time limits); United States
v. Gaines, 690 F2d 849 (11 th Cir. 1982) (counsel may not be prevented from making
all legal arguments supported by the facts).
54 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-1.4 (2d ed. 1986).
55 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The court's
opening remarks to the jurors emphasizing the dispatch he expected, coupled with
the immoderate treatment accorded defense counsel for his allegedly unjustified attempts to delay the trial, can only be judged by us to have put undue pressure on the
jury to reach a verdict more swiftly than the ends of justice will allow.").
56 United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F3d 426, 437 (5th Cir. 1995) ("in multiplecount, multiple-defendant criminal cases tried en masse, especially those involving
complex factual scenarios, trial courts should be mindful that each defendant should
be given adequate time in closing argument to mete out the evidence and issues
particular to that defendant and individualize his/her defense to the jury").
57 Compare State v. Mitchell, 365 SE2d 554 (NC 1988) (refusing to allow both
defense attorneys to address jury during closing argument in murder case prejudicial
error), and Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (arbitrarily
limiting closing argument in grand larceny prosecution to 10 minutes reversible error), with United States v. Bednar, 728 F2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1984) (limit of20 minutes
upheld), and United States v. Fesler, 781 F2d 384 (5th Cir. 1986) (limit of 22.5
minutes upheld).
58 United States v. Hall, 77 F3d 398, 400 (11th Cir. 1996) (preventing counsel
from arguing legal concepts that would be included in judge's jury instructions was
abuse of discretion); United States v. Tory, 52 F3d 207, 210 (9th Cir. 1995) (excluding legal argument plausibly based on the evidence was abuse of discretion).
59 Stockton v. State, 544 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1989).
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counsel's ability to develop his argument. Moreover, the time limit was
set mainly for the convenience of the jurors to enable them to finish the
case before the weekend. Similarly, restricting counsel's argument to
one hour in a capital murder case was held to be an abuse of discretion. 60 As the court noted, "[T]he unreasonableness of this restriction is
accentuated when it is realized that the outcome was to cast the die of
fate for the whole of eternity for the defendant."61
However, when potentially complex issues are not seriously disputed,62 or do not require elaborate presentation,63 no abuse of discretion will be found. Moreover, the failure of defense counsel to request
additional time at the termination of closing argument may bear on the
soundness of the judge's limitation. 64 Other substantive restrictions also
can be error. 65 Examples include forbidding counsel to argue proper
inferences from the evidence,66 refusing to allow arguments on points
of law that are included in the judge's charge,67 refusing to allow more
than one of defendant's counsel to address the jury in a capital murder
case,68 refusing to allow defense counsel to reserve opening argument
until the government completed its case,69 or forcing defense counsel to
complete closing argument before a recess as a sanction for purportedly delaying the tria1. 70
Collier v. State, 705 P2d 1126 (Nev. 1985).
Id. at 1131-1132. Compare Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (limiting time for closing argument in grand larceny case to 10 minutes reversible conduct), with Williams v. State, 453 So. 2d 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(limiting time for closing argument in burglary prosecution to 45 minutes permissible).
62 United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F3d 426 (5th Cir. 1995) (existence of conspiracy not challenged).
63 United States v. Leal, 30 F3d 577, 586 (5th Cir. 1994) (defense of lack of intent
did not require extended discussion).
64 Leal, 30 F3d at 577, 586.
65 Preventing defense counsel from arguing possible punishment is generally disallowed. See United States v. McDonald, 933 F2d 1519,1526 (10th Cir. 1991). But
see United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411 (MD Tenn. 1993) (permitting argument on possible punishment under federal sentencing guidelines).
66 Tory, 52 F3d at 207,210.
60

61

,

;1

:,

"I

67 United States v. Hall, 77 F3d 398, 400-401 (11th Cir. 1996) (error to prevent
counsel from speaking about concept of reasonable dOUbt). But see United States v.
Lerch, 996 F2d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1993) (circuit rule barring attorneys from attempting to define reasonable doubt to ajury).
68 State v. Mitchell, 365 SE2d 554 (NC 1988).

United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1979).
70 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976).

69
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Ajudge has the discretion to allow additional argument following a
supplemental instruction, particularly when a new legal theory is presented to the jury.71 Refusing to allow additional argument in such circumstances may constitute an abuse of discretion when it prevents
counsel from making a point essential to the defense. 72 Appellate courts
will examine the contested limitation in light of the issues and counsel's
main argument to determine whether the defense was prejudiced by the
limitation. 73
Restricting Cross-Examination

The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 74 However, the right
of cross-examination, whether analyzed as a constitutional or an
evidentiary matter, is not absolute. As a constitutional issue, a judge
must afford the defense a reasonable opportunity to develop the whole
picture, and an appellate court reviews any limitation de novo.75 Assuming that core constitutional concerns have been satisfied, judges
are afforded broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on crossexamination. Legitimate concerns include harassment of witnesses,
confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant, and such restrictions will be reversible error
only when discretion has been manifestly abused. 76 As the United States
Supreme Court has observed, counsel must be allowed "an opportunity
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."77
However, ajudge's wide latitude to regulate cross-examination does
not justify a "curtailment which keeps from the jury relevant and im71 United States v. Civelli, 883 F2d 191,196 (2d Cir. 1989); Loveless v. United
States, 260 F2d 487 (DC Cir. 1958).
72 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F2d 712, 713 (DC Cir. 1971).
73 United States v. Horton, 921 F2d 540 (4th Cir. 1990) (no prejudice by judge
permitting only three minutes of argument after supplementary instruction).
74 Davis v. Alaska, 415 US 308,315-316 (1974).
75 United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d 22, 28 (lst Cir. 1996).
76 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 (1986); Alford v. United States, 282
US 687, 694 (1931); Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d at 22,28; United States v. MaldonadoRivera. 922 F2d 934.955 (2d Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) ("court shall
exercise reasonable control over mode and interrogation of witnesses"); Fed. R. Evid.
611(b) (judge controls scope of cross-examination).
77 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 US 15,20 (1985). See also Davis, 415 US at 308,
316.
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portant facts bearing on the trustwOlthiness of crucial testimony."78 Probing a witness's motivation in testifying, including possible self-interest
and any bias or prejudice against the defendant, is one of the principal
objects of cross-examination, whose limitation by the judge produces
frequent appellate challenges. A judge's prohibition or substantial curtailment of cross-examination into a witness's bias is likely to be error. 79
Thus, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,80 it was constitutionally impermissible for the trial judge to bar all cross-examination of a government witness concerning a prior criminal charge that had been dismissed
in an effort to secure the witness's testimony. Similarly, in Davis v.
Alaska,8] counsel was not allowed to cross-examine the government's
principal witness as to the reason for his cooperation. Convictions ordinarily are reversed when the judge completely bars cross-examination
as to the witness's motivation for testifying,82 or with respect to other
relevant areas of testimony.83 A judge acts within permissible discretion when he or she limits cross-examination that is cumulative,84 repetitive,85 of marginal relevance,86 harassing,87 or otherwise improper. 88
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n United States v. Pedroza, 750 F2d 187, 195-196 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 344 US 414, 423 (1953».
7~ Olden v. Kentucky, 488 US 227 (1988); Van Arsdall, 475 US 31678-679; Davis
v. Alaska, 415 US 308, 318 (1974); Henry v. Speckard, 22 F3d 1209 (2d Cir. 1994).
But see United States v. Salerno, 937 F2d 797, 810 (2d Cir. 1991) ("a defendant does
not have an absolute right to ex.amine a government witness to elicit evidence of
bias"); Ebb v. Stale, 671 A2d 974 (Md. 1996) (barring cross-examination of government witness about pending criminal charges not abuse of discretion).
80 VanArsdall, 475 US at 673.
81 Davis, 415 US at 308.
82 United States v. Alexius, 76 F3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pritchett,
699 F2d 317 (6th Cir. 1983); People v. Eckert, 551 NE2d 820 (III. App. Ct. 1990);
Ford v. United States, 549 A2d 1124 (DC App. 1988); People v. Pressley, 513 NE2d
921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
83 United States v. Reindeau, 947 F2d 32 (2d Cir. 1991) (improper restriction of
cross-examination of expert); Crandel l v. United States, 703 F2d 74, 76 (4th Cir.
1983) (restricting cross-examination of ex pert wi tness); People v. Carter, 450 NYS2d
203 (NY App. Div. 1982) (restricting cross-examination of complainant). See also
Pollard v. Fennell, 400 F2d 421 (4th Cir. .1968).
84 United States v. Mitchell, 49 F3d 769, 780 (DC Cir. 1995) (defense counsel
cross-examined another government witness concerning same matter).
85 Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d at 22, 28.
86 United States v. Corgain, 5 F3d 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (fact that bank teller had not
identified other participants in robbery marginally relevant).
87 United States v. McCarty, 82 F3d 943 (10th Cir. 1996) (questions concerning
unsupported allegations of sexual impropriety of government witness disallowed).
88 United States v. Rainone, 32 F3d 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) (questions about notes
witness wrote to his attorney invade attorney-client privilege).
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Even if the judge's restriction on cross-examination is unreasonable and arguably a violation of the right of confrontation, harmless
error analysis must still be performed. ~l) Among the factors considered
in assessing the effect of the error are the importance of the witness's
testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence of contradictory evidence on material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and the strength of the evidence against the defendantYo When a judge does not bar cross-examination completely, but
allows counsel some latitude to explore the issue, the restriction ordinarily will be upheld. 91 Counsel whose cross-examination has been restricted should make reasonable efforts to alert the judge to the relevance
of the proposed interrogation .92
Interference With Attorney-Client Consultation

A judge has a duty to respect the attorney-client relationship.93 Judicial interference with counsel's ability to consult with a client may
run afoul of this precept and violate the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Such nonconsultation directives typically occur
during recesses in a trial when the defendant is on the witness stand.
The rationale behind such nondiscussion orders rests not on the assumption that defense counsel will engage in unethical coaching, but
rather, that when a defendant becomes a witness he or she has no constitutional right to consult with his or her lawyer while testifying. 94
For example, in Geders v. United States,95 the Supreme Court held
that a trial judge's order directing the defendant not to consult with his
X9 Henry v. Speckard, 22 F3d 1209, 1215-1216 (2d Cir. 1994 ) (constitutional
error in restricting cross-examination into possible bias but error harmless).
9() Id. at 1215-1216.
91 Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d at 22, 28; United States v. Cruz, 894 F2d 41 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Slone, 833 F2d 595 (6th Cir. 1987); Van Ness v. United
States, 568 A2d 1079 (DC App. 1990).
92 Jones v. Berry, 880 F2d 670, 673 (2d Cir. 1989). See also United States v.
Blackwood, 456 F2d 526 (2d Cir. 1972) (judge's refusal to recall government witness during defendant's case not abuse of discretion when defense counsel failed to
explain why he did not cross-examine witness on subject during his earlier crossexamination).
93 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-2.5 (2d ed. 1986).
94 Perry v. Leeke, 488 US 272 (1989). Such nondiscussion orders are a corollary
to the broader rule authorizing judges to sequester witnesses to lessen danger that
their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses say and to increase likelihood that they will give truthful testimony.
95 Geders v. United States, 425 US 80 (1976) .
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attorney during an overnight recess, called while the defendant was on
the witness stand, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel. Because normal consultation between counsel and client during an overnight recess would embrace matters that go
well beyond the defendant's own testimony, such as the availability of
other witnesses, trial tactics, and the possibility of a plea bargain, the
judge's order effectively barred discussion of these matters and thereby
violated the defendant's constitutional right to consult with (;Ounse!.
Since Geders, federal and state courts have addressed the permissibility of orders barring access by a criminal defendant to his or her
attorney during other trial recesses. 96 In reviewing the permissibility of
such nonconsultation orders, a distinction is usually drawn between
lengthy and brief recesses. For example, in Perry v. Leeke,97 the Supreme Cou111imited Geders, holding that an order directing the defendant not to can ult with his attorney during a I5-minute recess declared
after the defendant completed his direct examination did not violate the
defendant's right to counsel: "[W]hen a defendant becomes a witness,
he has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is
testifying."98 In distinguishing between long and short recesses, the Supreme Court explained that a defendant should not be prevented from
consulting with counsel on trial-related matters during a lengthy re-

96 United S tates v. Cobb, 905 F2d 784 (41h Cir. 1990) (order prohibiting defendant from discussing cross-examination during weekend recess violated Sixth Amendment); Sanders v. Lane, 861 F2d 1033 (7lh Cir. 198H) (error to deny access during
lunchtime recess)' Bova v. Dugger, 858 F2d 1539 ( 11th Cir. 1988) (error to deny
access during IS-minute recess); People v. Joseph, 646 NE2d 807 (NY L994) (error
to bar communication during weekend recess); People v. Enrique, 600 NE2d 229
(NY 1992) (not improper to ban consultation during luncheon recess called during
cross-examination of defendant); Moore v. Commonwea lth , 771 SW2d 34 (Ky. 1989)
(not improper to bar consultation during luncheon recess called during direct examination of defendant); Wooten-Bey v. Slate 547 A2d J 086 (Md. App. 1988) (error to
deny acces " during lengU1Y lu nche 11 recess. but error c ured by permitt.ing
postiuncheon discussion with counse l and opportunity for further redirect).

V7

Perry v. Leeke, 488 US 272 ([ 989).

~8 rd. at 281. The Court analogized the situation to the familiar rule allowing a

judge to sequester witnesses to maintain the integrity of te timony. See Fed. R. Evid.
615; United Slates v. Hargrove, 929 F2d 3J6, 320- 32 1 (7th Cir. 1991) (no violation
of sequestration order when government's witnes ' was not intended (0 be called and
was called only after testimony of surprise witnes for the defense); United States v.
Lu s~i er, 929 F2d 25, 30 (lsI Cir. 1991) (defendant nol prejudiced by judge s order
allowing government's case agent to remain in court); United States v. Nazzaro, 472
F2d 303 (2d Cil'. 1973) (judge acted improperly in exempting government agent
from sequestration order); State v. Kennedy, 250 SE2d 338 (SC 1978) (judge refuses
to sequester witnesses during defendant's testimony, telling defense counsel in presence of jury: "I want them to hear this fellow's lies.' ).
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cess. 99 Moreover, even during a short recess, ajudge may permit consultation with counsel regarding trial issues generally, but bar discussion concerning ongoing testimony. 100
Undermining Counsel's Ability to Defend Effectively
Judges in various ways can hamper defense counsel's ability to
challenge the prosecution's case effectively. Some of these actions defy
any unifying principle; they often appear to be idiosyncratic. Judges
have interfered with counsel's ability to make independent decisions
concerning how to present the defense by barring defense summation
at a bench trial,101 barring the defendant from giving testimony in his or
her own defense,102 requiring that the defendant be the first defense
witness,103 barring direct examination of the defendant,104 limiting the
number of witnesses that the defense may call,105 restricting defense
counsel's right to consult with his or her own expert,106 and limiting
defense access to prospective witnesses. 107
Judicial actions that deny the defendant the resources to mount an
effective defense must be carefully scrutinized under equal protection
and due process principles. An indigent defendant may not be deprived
of the basic tools necessary to conduct an adequate defense. Transcripts
of prior proceedings, such as prior trials, suppression hearings, preliminary hearings, and previous testimony in the same trial, are vital tools
needed to conduct an effective defense. Indigents have a constitutional
right to be afforded free transcripts when reasonably necessary to present

99 Cobb, 905 F2d at 784 (order prohibiting defendant from discussing cross-examination during weekend recess violated Sixth Amendment).
100 People v. Stoner, 432 NE2d 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
101 Herring v. New York, 422 US 853 (1975).
102 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44 (1987). But see United States v. Stewart, 20 F3d
911 (8th Cir. 1994) (refusal to allow defendant to testify after both sides rested and
closing arguments about to begin not error).
103 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 US 605 (1972).
104 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 US 570 (1961).

United States v. Holmes, 44 F3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1995).
People v. Santana, 600 NE2d 201 (NY 1992) (court bars consultation until
after prosecution expert completed his testimony).
107 United States v. Medina, 992 F2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993) (denial of defense request to interview government witness until after his direct testimony did not deprive defendants of right to fair trial).
105

106
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an effective defense. 108 The mere request for a transcript, however, does
not automatically require the court to order its preparation at state expense. The denial of a transcript, which is reviewed d novo, is a constitutional error only when the transcript is of value t the trial for which
it is sought, and there are no adequate alternatives that would fulfill the
same functions as a transcript. 109
It can ordinarily be assumed that a transcript is valuable in providing the defense with pretrial discovery as welJ as a lool for impeachment of prosecution witnesses. It is infrequent that a transcript will be
found to be of little value in challenging the prosecution's case. 110 More
likely will be the claim that adequate alternatives exist, such as the
ability of counsel to reconstruct the prior proceedings, or to call the
court reporter as a witness. I I ) Relevant factors are the nature of the proceeding, length of the proceeding, length of the interval, and familiarity of present counsel with the previous proceeding.) 1'2. The defen e does
not have any burden of establishing a particularized need for the transcript,
or to refute a claim that adequate alternatives exist 113 Whether prejudice
needs to be shown following the denial of a transcript is unclear.))4
In addition to denying free transcripts courts can also impede an
effective defense by denying an indigent free expert r investigative
assistance. A defendant is constitutionally entitled to such assistance. 115
In contrast to the furnishing of transcripts, the defendant bears the burden of establishing with reasonable particularity the necessity for such
assistance. 116 The court's determination is reviewed for abuse of discre108 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 US 226 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 US 40
(1967); United States v. Pul ido, 879 F2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1989); People v. Coleman,
61 L N1!2d 285 (NY 1993). See also 18 USC § 3006A( e)( I).
109 Britt, 404 US at 227.
110 Matthews v. Price, 83 F3d 328 (10th Cir. 1996) (transcript would have offered
relatively little value in cross-examining police officer about lack of penetration
during sexual assault because penetration is not element of crime).
III Britt, 404 US at 228.
112 Pulido, 879 F2d at 1255.
113 Britt, 404 US at 228. Britt was a unique case, resting on highly specialized
circumstances, including defense counsel's virtual concession of the existence of
adequate alternatives to a transcript.
114 Compare United States v. Kirk, 844 F2d 660 (9lh Ck \988) (prejudice required), and United States v. Bari, 750 F2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1984) (prejudice required),
with United States v. Pulido, 879 F2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1989) (no prejudice need be
shown).
115 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (\985).
116 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 US 320, 323 n.l (1985) (ballistics and fingerprint
expert); Ake, 470 US al68 (psychjatric expert); United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d
373 (10th Cir. 1986) (investigative assistance).
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tion,1I7 and any error in denying the request must be shown to have
prejudiced the defense. 118
Finally, courts can undermine effective representation in other ways,
such as ordering the defense to proceed under conflicted representation, 119 removing the defense attorney from the case, I 20 or denying a pro
se defendant the right to participate in sidebar conferences with the
court. 121 Ajudge's failure to adequately explain the basis for a ruling or
order not only hampers defense counsel's ability to make subsequent
decisions but also interferes with an appellate court's ability to review
the record properly. 122

117

United States v. Nichols, 21 F3d 1016 (lOth Cir. 1994).

118Id .
119 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 US 475 (1978); Selsor v. Kaiser, 81 F3d 1492 (10th
Cir. 1996).
120 People v. Johnson. 547 NW2d 65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Harling v. United
States, 387 A2d 1101 (DC App. 1978); Smith v. Superior Ct. ofLo Angeles County.
440 P2d 65 (Cal. 1968). A court may remove a lawyer 011 the basis of gr ss incompetence, physical incapacity. or contumacious cond uct. Johllson, 547 NW2d at 68.
Prejudice need not be shown when defendant is arbitrarily denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of hi s choice. Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F3d
1469. 1478 (9th Cir. 1994).
121 United States v. McDermott, 64 F3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1995); People v. Rosen,
613 NE2d 946 (NY 1993). See Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975). But see
United States v. Mills, 895 F2d 897 (2d Cir. 1990) (no "substantial violation" of
sixth amendment Faretta right wbere standby counsel participated and defendant
excluded in only a few instances). If a Sixth Amendment violation relating to the
Faretta right to conduct one's own defense is found, hannless error analysis does
not apply. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 US 168. 177 n.8 (1984).
122 A judge should adequately explain the basis for ruling lO enable an appellate
court to review the matter. Failure to make a proper record may require remand for
factual findings. See Guzman v. Scully, 80 F3d 772. 776 (2d Cir. L996) (remand for
failure to make specitic findings demonstrating that closing the courtroom during
testimony of prosecution witness essential and narrowly tailored); Duckett v. Godinez,
67 F3d 734. 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (remlU1d for failure 10 make sufficient and specific
fmdings as to necessity of physical restraints on defendant); Uoited States v. Nagib,
56 F3d 798, 807 (7th Cir. 1995) (remanded for failure to make specific findings to
support admission of evidence of prior bad acts as probative of defendant's knowledge and motive). See also United States v. Jackson, 60F3d 128, L35 (2d Cir. 1995)
("It would have been helpful to our review of the [sequestration] issue jf the trial
judge had articulated the basis for the exerci e of her discretion' ); Helium v. Warden, 28 F3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 1994) ("It would have been helpful to us" if trial court
articulated its reasons for imposing securilY measure ); United State v. Perez, 35
F3d 632 (1 st Cir. 1994) ("as a general matter district courts should articulate the bases of
their factual findings related to Batson challenges more clearly"). But see United States
v. Gonzales, 12 F3d 298, 300 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We do not demand that judges, when
explaining the bases for their rulings, be precise to the point of pedantry.").
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Refusal to Grant Recess or Continuance
The decision to grant or deny a recess or continuance ordinarily lies
within a judge' broad discretion to administer the trial. l23 Such determinations are error only for a clear abuse of discretion 124 "Only unreasonable and arbitrary insi tence upon expeditiousness in the face of
justifiable request for delay constitutes an abuse of discretion."'25 The
burden is on the defense to demonstrate cJeady that it has been prejudiced by the judge' refusal to grant a delay. 126 A reviewing c urt will
examine several factors, including the inconvemence on the COUlt, witnesses, counsel, or the parties; whether other continuances have been
granted; whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay; whether the
delay is the defendant's faLllt; and whether a denial would prejudice the
defendant. 127 The last factQr is the most critical. An appellate court will
not reverse unless the defendant suffered prejudice. 128
To be sure, judges "cannot permit tbemseJve to become sanctuaries for chrome procrastination and irrespon ibility on the part of either
litigants or attorneys."129 Nevertheless, requests for continuances are
often made in good faith, and nOl for lack of due diligence, and under
circum tances in which the denial may serioLlsly impair a defendant's
right to a fair trial. The denjal of a reque ,t for a delay based on illness of
a patty witness, or counsel may be an abuse of discretion when there
has been a suffi.cient showing thal the request was made in good faith,
and that prejudice would result from the denial. '30 Similarly, when a

'"

123 Morris v. Slappy, 461 US 1,11 (1983); United States v. Tran, 16 F3d 897. 905
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lussier. 929 F2d 25, 28 (lst Cir. 1991); United
States v. Wynne. 993 F2d 760,767 (lOlh Cit. 1993); United States v. Cordell. 924
F2d 614 (6th Cir. ] 991); People v. Singleton, 361 NE2d 1003 (NY 1977). See Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Federal District Judge's Granting or Denying Brief Recess During Trial. 2 1 ALR Fed. 948 (1974).
)24 United States v. Studley, 783 F2d 934 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Martin,
740 F2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1984).
125 United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F2d 532, 545 (1st Cif. 1991).
)26

United States v. Wirsing, 719 F2d 859, 866 (6th Cir. 1983).

127 Unjted State v. Fowlie, 24 F3d 1059. 1069 (9th Cir. J994). For a similar
formulation, see United States v. Soldevila-Lopez. 17 F3d 480. 488 (1stOr. 1994)
(citing as factors the defendant's diligence in being ready for the proceeding; the
Ilkelihood that a continuance would serve a useful purpose; inconvenience to the
parties. courl. or witnesses; and prejudice to the defendant); United States v. Wynne.
993 F2d 760, 767 (10th Clr. 1993) (same).
128 United States v. Maybusher, 735 F2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1984).
129 County of San Bernardino v. Dorio Mining & Eng'g Corp., 72 Cal. App. 3d
776, 780, 140 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1977).
130 Moll v. Moll, 231 NW2d 769 (Mo. 1975); Kalmus v. Kalmus, 230 P2d 57,63
(Cal. 1951).
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fundamental right is involved, such as securing the attendance of a
material witness, a judge's refusal to grant a delay may be an abuse of
discretion and a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 131 When delays are
requested to secure the attendance of witnesses, counsel must show
that he or she made a good faith effort to secure the witness's attendance prior to requesting the adjournment, 132 and that the witness would
provide favorable evidence. 133
By contrast, denying a brief recess during the trial to permit counsel to confer with a client concerning crucial trial matters, such as
whether the defendant should take the stand, does not obstruct orderly
procedure. 134 However, some showing should be made as to the necessity for the delay, and the prejudice that would result from its denial. 135
Moreover, when the defense has been given ample opportunity to protect its interests, such as having already been granted several adjournments, the refusal of a judge to further accommodate counsel will
ordinarily be upheld. 136
Denial of a request to give counsel more time to prepare will be
evaluated in light of the reasons for the request, the good faith and
diligence of counsel, and the resulting prejudice from the refusal of the
judge to honor the request. 137 A request for a continuance based on preju131 Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial
of continuance to obtain new counsel violated Sixth Amendment); Wirsing, 719 F2d
at 859; Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F2d 6 I 8 (2d Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Johnson, 375
F. Supp. 872 (WD Mich. 1974) (defendant's motion for a day's continuance to secure presence of crucial witnesse violated right to compulsory process); People v.
Foy, 299 NE2d 664 (NY 1973); Peopl v. O burn, 547 NYS2d 749 (NY App. Div.
1989). But see Unjted States v. Tran, 16 P3d 897,906 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Beverly, 5 F3d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1,993); People v. Belotti, 563 NYS2d 510 (NY
App. Div. 1990); State v. Monahan, 480 A2d 863 (NH 1984).
132 Belotti, 563 NYS2d at 510.
133 Lefkowitz, 583 F2d at 623 ("in the absence of some showing of what favorable
evidence the witness would provide if compelled to testify, it is not improper to deny
a continuance"). When government conduct has contributed to the unavailability of
the witness, Ule requisite showing is relaxed. rd.
134 People v. Spears, 474 NE2d 1189 (NY 1984).

United States v. Darby, 744 F2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984).
136 United States v. Brand, 80 F3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996); People v. Singleton, 361
NE2d 1003 (NY 1977).
137 Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial
of continuance to substitute new counsel abuse of discretion and violation of Sixth
Amendment); Darby, 744 F2d at 1508 (denial of continuance neither an abuse of
discretion nor a violation of due process); Kelly v. Wingo, 472 F2d 717 (6th Cir.
1973); Commonwealth v. Fleming, 480 A2d 1214 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1984); Nave v,
State, 318 SE2d 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), Moreover, counsel's failure to file a moLion for a continuance is an important factor in evaluating the claim. See Birt v.
Montgomery, 725 F2d 587, 595 ( 11th Cir. 1984 ) (en banc).
135
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dicial media publicity must be carefully examined to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that absent such relief a fair trial cannot
be had. 138 Finally, denial of a request for a continuance because the
defendant is surprised by unexpected evidence is usually error only
when the defendant can show that the situation was unforeseen and that
prejudice resulted. 139

Rulings on Evidence and Witnesses
Evidentiary rulings can be the most pivotal events in a trial. A trial
judge enjoys considerable discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, 140 and rulings that are not unreasonable or arbitrary withstand
appellate attack. The familiar yardstick used by appellate courts in reviewing evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. 141 Discretion, of
course, "does not mean immunity from accountability."142 When discretion is abused, error is committed, and if sufficiently harmful, may
result in reversal of the conviction. 143 Although abuse of discretion with
138 United States v. De Cruz, 82 P3d 856 (9th Cir. 1996); United States ex reI.
Dogget v. Yeager, 472F2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Perez-Casillas. 593 F.
Supp. 794 (D. PR 1984).
139 United States v. Brand, 80 F3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996) (lasL-minute decision of codefendant Lo plead guilty and become government's chief witness neither unforeseeable nor prejudicial); United States v. Dennis, 843 F2d 652 (2d Cir. 1988).
140 Hamling v. United States, 4 18 US 87. 124-125 (1974); UniLed States v. Fountain, 83 F3d 946,949 (8th Cjr. 1996) (evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed "absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion"); United Slates v. Krenzelok,
874 F2d 480. 482 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Only in an eXLreme case are appellate judges
competent to secondguess the judgment of the person on the spot, the trial judge.");
United States v. MacDollald, 688 F2cl224 234 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan, J.• concurring) ("I would have exercised the wide discretion conferred on [the trial judge]
to allow the testimony to come in."). The subject of judicial discretion in trial rulings
generally is an extremely broad and c mplex topic. For ex.tensive treatment of the
subject, see Aharon Barak, Judicial Discretion (J 987); J. Eric Smlthburn . Judicial
Discretion (1980); Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949).
14 1 However. when legal issues predominate, appellate review of evidentiary rulings is de novo. See United States v. Thompson, 37 F3d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1994)
(whether admis ibility of physical evidence i relevant to defense based on lack of
knowledge Is a legal question subjecL to de novo review).
142 United States v. Dwyer, 539 F2d 924,928 (2d Cir. 1976).
14 3 See, e.g., United States v. Sorondo, 845 F2d 945 (II th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Dotson, 799 F2d 189 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. McBride, 786 F2d 45 (2d
Cir. 1986); Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F2d 282 (ISl Clr. 1979). But see United States
v. Krenzelok, 874 F2d 480 (7tb Cir. 1989) (no abu e of discretion to admit statements by federal judge in unrelated case in rebutting defendant's claim that he in
good faith believed that certain trusts were invalid); United States v. Sullivan. 803
F2d 87 (3d Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discreLion to exclude 10 judges as character
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respect to evidentiary rulings is not coextensive with trial misconduct,
erroneous evidentiary rulings, when considered together with other instances of misconduct or bias, may tend to magnify errors and more
likely result in reversal. 144
Erroneous evidentiary rulings are usually analyzed as nonconstitutional events. However, such rulings, particularly when they exclude
critical defense evidence, may also be interpreted as constitutional error when the defense has been deprived of a fair opportunity to establish a defense in violation of due process or compulsory process. 145 If
an appellate court frames the error in that fashion, a much more defendant-friendly standard of review is used,146 and reversal consequently
is more likely. Appellate courts appear to exercise somewhat tighter
control when reviewing ajudge's evidentiary rulings that exclude vital
defense evidence. 147 By contrast, rulings that admit relevant prosecution evidence, even evidence that is highly inflammatory and prejudicial, are often accorded considerable appellate deference. 148
witnesses); United Slates v. Ciampa, 793 F2d J 9 (1 st Cir. (986) (no abuse of discretion to exclude evidence as being cumulative). Erroneous evidentiary rulings are
subject to the "harmless error" rule. See United States v. Puzzo, 928 F2d 1356 (2d
Cir. 1991) (restriction of defendant' le limony harmless error); United States v.
Cortez, 935 F2d 135 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing law enforcement witnesses to testify
to truthfulness of government witness improper, but harmless).
144 United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F3d 415 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. EdwardoFranco, 885 F2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1989).
145 State v. Carter, 636 A2d 821, 830 (Conn. 1994) (exclusion of vital defense
evidence deprived defendant of Sixth Amendment right fairly to present to the jury
his version of the facts).
146 Chapman v. California, 386 US 18,24 (1967) (prosecution must demonstrate
that error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt).
147 United States v. Hall, 93 F3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996); United Stales v. Thompson,
37 F3d450 (9th Cir. 1994); United Slales v. Van Dyke. 14 F3d 415 (8th Cir. 1994);
State v. Carter, 636 A2d 821 (Conn. 1994). A defense witness's refusal to testify
based on a privilege raises olber significant issues. When a prosecution witness asserts a pri vilege on ct'Oss-examjn<ltion and thereby depri yes the defense of the ability
to test the witness's veracity on importam substanti ve matters, the judge is obligated
to strike the direct testimony. and the fail.ure to do so is error. United States v. Cardillo.
316 F2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1963). However, there is no duty to strike testimony when
the privilege bars cross-examination into collateral matters only. See United States
v. Brooks, 82 F3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1996) (prosecution witness's invocation of
privilege after direct examination did not prevent cross-examination "into the details of his direct testimony" so that "the defense is deprived of the right to test the
truth of his direct testimony"); United States v. Berrio-Londono, 946 F2d 158 (lst
Cir. 1991) (not error to refuse to strike direct testimony of co-conspirator who took
Fifth Amendment in regard to prior drug deals with a co-conspirator other than defendant).
J48 United States v. Rivera, 83 F3d 542 (1st Cir. 1996) (unrelated prior rape);
Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F3d 891 (9th Cif. 1996) (threats to witnesses); United
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The more rigorous appellate oversight that is usually associated with
rulings that exclude relevant defense evidence is often noticeable with
respect to rulings relating to scienLilic or other technical proof. Thus,
excluding psychiatric testimony when the defendant's mental state is a
crucial issue in the case can be an abuse of discretion. 149 Error may also
be shown in rulings excluding experl testimony on the issue of the reliability of eyewitness identification. 150 Exclusion of expert testimony in
other contexts has also been held to be an abuse of discretion. 151 Discretion, of course, must be applied evenhandedly. Excluding expert proof
for the defense while allowing expert proof from the prosecution on the
same issue ordinarily is an abuse of discretion. 152
One of the more controversial issues involves the imposition of
evidentiary sanctions against the defense, particularly the preclusion of
defense proof, for violations of discovery rules. In Taylor v. Illinois,153
States v. BUller, 7 I F3d 243 (7th Cir. 1995) (gang membership) ; People v. Wood ,
591 NE2d I 178 (NY 1992) (gruesome photos). Bul see U Itiled States v. Irvin, 87
F3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996) (abuse of discretion to admit extensive evidence of defendant'
membership in gang); Standen v. Whitley, 994 F2d 14 17 (9th Cir. 1993) (withdrawn
gui lty plea improperly admitted as substantive proof of guilt); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 43 I SE2d 906 (Va. ct. App. 1993) (forensic evidence improperly admitted
and discretion abused when prejudice substantially outweighs probative value).
149 United States v. McBrid ,786 F2d 45 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Dwyer,
539 F2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976). But see United Stales v. Newman, 849 F2d 156 (5th Cir.
]988) (no abuse of discretion in excluding expert testimony that certain mental defects make one more susceptible to entrapment); United Stales v. Esch. 832 F2d 531
(lOth Cif. 1987) (no abuse of discretion in excluding testimony of cl.inical psychologist that defendant did not possess the capacity to form lhe requisite mental state).
150 United States v. Stevens, 935 F2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991); State v. Moon. 726 P2d
1263 (Wash. App. 1986). See United States v. S lIers. 566 F2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977).
But see United States v. Kime, 99 F3d 870, 883-884 (81h Cil'. 19 6) (no abuse of
discretion to exclude ex.perl witness on reliability of eyewi.tness identification); United
States v. Blade, 811 F2d 46 L (8th Cir. 1987) (no abuse f discretion in excluding
expert testimony on eyewitness identification WheJl government's case did not rest
exclusively on eyewitness testimony).
lSI See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 93 F3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (abu e of ruscretion to exclude expert testimony regarding defendant's susceptibility to giving false
confe sion). This assumes that the defendant hr~. complied with discovery rules. See
United States v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975) (no error in excl uding testimony of
expert witness after defendant refused to permit discovery of relevant inve tigative
report); UnHed States v. Cervone, 906 F2d 332. 346 (2d ir. 1990) (no error to exclude testimony of expert witness for defendant's failure to comply with statutory
notice requirements). For civil cases fiJlding an abuse of discretion in exclud ing
experttestimony, see Garrett v. Desa indus. , Inc., 705 F2d 72 1 (4th Cir. 1983) (abuse
of discretion to exclude mechanical engineer's testimony concerning i sue of safety
of particular tool); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty. Sch. Disl., 437 A2d 1198 CPa.
1981) (abuse of discretion to exclude former fo tbal! coach's testimony concerning
issue of safety in conducting practices).
152 United States v. Sellers. 566 F2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977).
153

484 US 400 (l984).
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the Supreme Court ruled that preclusion of defense testimony of an
alibi witness as a sanction for a discovery violation did not violate the
Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause, particularly when the
violation appeared to be willful and the proffered evidence perjurious. 154
Courts relying on Taylor to exclude defense evidence have emphasized
that the discovery violation was deliberate, ISS involved dilatory tactics,156
related to evidence of minimal probative value,157 or was prejudicial to
the judicial process. 158 Appellate courts routinely allow the trial judge
wide latitude in policing discovery violations, and find error only when
discretion is abused. 159 Moreover, preclusion of defense evidence, even
if erroneous, is reversible only when it is sufficiently prejudicial. 160
Aside from preclusion for discovery violations, other restrictive
rulings or conduct with respect to defense evidence can be a source of
error. Consistent with the function as manager of the trial, a judge is
authorized to exclude defense evidence that is irrelevant, repetitive, or
cumulative; 161 to limit the number of defense witnesses; 162 and even to
exclude the defendant's own testimony.163 A judge under certain circumstances may restrict defense access to prosecution witnesses. 164
However, a judge has a duty to ensure that a defendant's right to compulsory process is not impaired when an important defense witness fails
to honor a subpoena. 165
154 Id. at 416-417. But see Michigan v. Lucas, 500 US 145, 153 (l991)(indicating
that Taylor authorizes preclusion even if no suggestion that proffered evidence was
perjurious). Preclusion is most often encountered in the context of alibi witnesses.
155 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995); Bowling v. Vose, 3 F3d 559 (lst
Cir. 1993); Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988); State v. Passino, 640
A2d 547 (Vt. 1994); Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 571 A2d 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990).
156 Tyson, 50 F3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995); State v. Killean, 915 P2d 1225 (Ariz. 1996);
Zimmerman, 571 A2d at 1062.
157 People of Territory of Guam v. Palomo, 35 F3d 368 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Duggan, 743 F2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
158 United States v. Johnson, 970 F2d 907 (DC Cir. 1992).
159 United States v. Davis, 40 F3d 1069 (10th Cir. 1994); Sandoval v. Acevedo,
996 F2d 145 (7th Cir. 1993); Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983);
People v. Gonzales, 28 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1994).
160 Tyson, 50 F3d at 436.
161
162
163
164
165

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 (1986).
United States v. Holmes, 44 F3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1994).
United States v. Stewart, 20 F3d 911 (8th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Medina, 992 F2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Simpson, 992 F2d 1224 (DC Cir. 1993).
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Trial judges also enjoy extremely broad discretion with respect to
real and demonstrative evidence. Rulings of admissibility are ordinarily
upheld if the evidence is relevant and properly authenticated. Special
problems can arise with respect to some types of real evidence. For
example, sound recordings c ntaining inaudible portions are admissible unless the incomprehen ible portions are 0 significant as to render the rec riling as a whole unrcliable. 166 Transcript are admitted if
reasonably accurate, and courts have devised procedures t minimize distortion and assist the jury's comprehension. 167 Courtroom demonstrations
purporting to reenact events at trial ,u'e permitted as long as the demonstration fairly depicts the events at issue. 168 Charts. summaries, and transparencies are cautiollsly allowed. as long as th evidence assist the jury and the
judge imposes safeguards to minimize possible prejudice. 169
A judge ordinarily shouJd make specific findings of the basis for an
evidentiary mling. 170 Failure to state the rea ons for an evidentiary ruling
can be a factor in finding an abu. e of iscretion.171 The "Law of the case"
doctrine ordinarily is not applicable to evidentiary rulings made during
prior proceedjngs ~ coordinate courts, therefore, are not bound by such rulings but may. in the exercise of discretion, reconsider sllch rulings.172

Rulings That Undermine the Presumption of Innocence
A fair trial before a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.173 A fundamental component of this due process guarantee is the
166 United States v. Webster, 84 F3d 1056, 1064 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Howard, 80 F3d 1194, 1198-1199 (7th Cir. 1996).
167 Howard, 80 F3d at 1199 Uudge should conduct hearing to assess accuracy of
government's transcript; if stipulated or official transcript cannot be produced, then
each side may produce its own version, and may introduce evidence supporting its
version).
168 United States v. Birch, 39 F3d 1089 (10th Cir. 1994) (demonstration reenacting defendant's version of shooting).
169 United States v. Johnson, 54 F3d 1150, 1162 (4th Cir. 1995) (organizational
chart summarizing complex drug conspiracy allowed with caveat that such evidence
would not be admissible in "ordinary federal drug prosecution"); United States v.
Crockett, 49 F3d 1357, 1362 (8Lh Cir. 1995) (pro ecutor's use of overhead transparencies to characterize evidence aUowed; although judges "have virtually unfettered
discretion to regulate the use of such non-evidentiary devices . . .. prosecutionruns a
tangible risk of creating reversible erIOr when it seeks to augment the impact of its
oral argument with pedagogic devices").
170 United States v. Nagib, 56 F3d 798 (7th Cir. 1995).

United States v. Dwyer, 539 F2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976).
United States v. Todd, 920 F2d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 1990).
173 Drope v. Missouri, 420 US 162, 172 (1975); In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136
(1955); In re Oliver, 333 US 257 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510 (1927).
171

172
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presumption of innocence. 174 Conduct and rulings by the trial judge can
violate due process by depriving an accused of the presumption of innocence. Thus, permitting a trial to take place in an atmosphere inflamed by public passion and a biased jury violates due process,175 as
does allowing a trial to be conducted in a "carnival atmosphere" of
media excess to the point where "bedlam reigned. " 176 More subtle, but
equally harmful impediments to a fair trial, include allowing spectators to
engage in demonstrations against the defendant, 177 carry identifiable signs
prejudicial to a defendant (such as wearing buttons inscribed with the words
"Women Against Rape" during a defendant's trial for sex offenses),178 or
insinuate to the jury that the defendant has AIDS by offering to provide
them with gloves if they wished to handle any exhibits. 179
Logistical decisions by the judge can impair the presumption of
innocence. Placing ajury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who are also
prosecution witnesses potentially erodes the presumption of innocence. 180 So do seating arrangements that allow the victim to sit at counsel
table with the prosecuting attorney during the trial. 181 Actual prejudice
174 The presumption of innocence is a basic component of a fair trial. As the Supreme Court observed in Coffin v. United States, 156 US 432, 453 (1895):

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.
175 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US 717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 US 181 (1952);
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 US 86 (1923).
176 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 US 532
(1965) .
177 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 559, 562 (1965).
178 Norris v. Risley, 918 F2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990). See People v. Pennisi, 563 NYS2d
612 (NY Sup. Ct. 1990) (judge refuses to allow courtroom spectators to wear obtrusive
corsages of red and black ribbons to show sympathy for victims in homicide prosecution). The situation probably is different where no jury is present. See Matter of Frankel
v. Roberts, 567 NYS2d 1018 (NY App. Div. 1991) (improper restriction on free speech
to order attorney to remove from lapel political button during nonjury proceedings).
179 Commonwealth v. Martin, 660 NE2d 670 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 676
NE2d 451 (Mass. 1997). See also Wiggins v. State, 554 A2d 356 (Md. 1989) (judge
committed reversible error in permitting guards to wear rubber gloves during trial of
defendant suspected of having AIDS). But see People v. Bonaventura, 563 NYS2d
465 (NY App. Div. 1990) (allowing court officers to wear surgical gloves while
handling evidentiary articles of defendant's clothing did not stigmatize defendant as
being diseased).
180 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 US 466 (1965).
lSI Mask v. State, 869 SW2d 1,4 (Ark. 1994) ("manipulation of seating arrangement ... tantamount to the Trial Court expressing an opinion on the credibility of
witnesses"). But see Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (statute
allows crime victim to sit at counsel table).
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in such cases may not need to be shown because the conduct is inherently prejudicial; it presents "an unacceptable risk of impermissible
factors coming into play."182
Other types of logistical arrangements usually withstand attack. For
example, judges have broad discretion to take measures to ensure the
safety and order of the proceedings. Thus, allowing uniformed and armed
police officials to sit directly behind a defendant was not error. 183 Nor
was it error to allow police officers to escort a defendant, a convicted murderer, to the witness stand, remain next to him while he testified, and escort
him back to his chair. 184 These measures have heen held not "inherently
prejudicial," and do not pose an "unacceptable risk of prejudice."185
By contrast, compelling a defendant to wear identifiable prison attire is inherently prejudicial, and may be violative of a fair trial by impairing the presumption of innocence. 186 Such a requirement plainly
"furthers no essential state policy," and violates the concept of equal
justice because it usually operates against indigents who cannot post
bail. 187 However, because the particular evil is compulsion, a defendant
must object to having to wear prison clothes at trial. 188 Moreover, even

Estelle v. Williams, 425 US 501, 505 (1976).
183 Id. at 572.
184 Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F3d 1226, 1232 (8th Cir. 1996) ("jury would view
the officers' presence and actions as ordinary and normal concern for the safety and
order of the pIoceeclings"). See also United States v. Darden, 70 F3d 1507 (8th Cir.
1995) (in trial of violent criminal enterprise, it was not error to use metal detectors
outside courtroom, sequestration, transportation by marshals, armed guards along
street, helicopters, and snipers on courthouse roof); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866
F2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (not error when guards used magnetometer to check everyone entering courtroom, PIO ecutor's bodyguards wore bulletproof vests and visibly carried guns, and guards audibly cocked guns when lights went out in courtroom);
State v. Aguilar, 352 NW2d 395, 396- 397 (Minn. 1984) (no prejudice from use of
metal detector).
185 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 US 560,571 (1986).
186 Estelle, 425 US at 504. See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.1(c)
(2d ed. 1986).
187 Estelle, 425 US at 505-506.
188 Id. at 509-510 (no compulsion when, possibly for tactical reasons, neither
defendant nor his counsel objected either before or at any time during trial). An
objection must be timely. See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F3d 577, 581 (2d Cif.
1995) (objection made on first day of trial timely because counsel objected as soon
as he became aware of client's appearance); United States v. Harris, 703 F2d 508.
511 (lith Cir. 1983) (same). But see United States v. Martin, 964 F2d 714, 719 (7th
Cir. 1992) (defendant should have objected before any trial proceedings had commenced and not waited until the middle of the first day of trial after entire jury
empaneled).
182
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when the defendant is compelled to wear prison clothes, the constitutional error is subject to harmless error analysis. 189
Ordering a defendant to be shackled, or even gagged, presents more
difficult problems. Clearly, the sight of a defendant bound and gagged
could have a profound impact on ajury's feelings about that defendant.
Shackles alone are inherently prejudicial because they are an "unmistakable indication of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large."190 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen 191
upheld the practice of binding and gagging a defendant when necessary
to control disruptive and contumacious conduct. Because "dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country,"192 the Court allowed trial judges wide discretion to control unruly
defendants, including exclusion from the courtroom, citing for contempt,
or shackling and gagging.
Due process requires that shackles be used only as a "last resort." 193
A judge acts within his or her discretion when he or she has a rational
and justifiable basis for such restraint. 194 The court's decision is error
only when the discretion is abused. 195 Shackling is appropriate when
the defendant presents a clear risk of escape, 196 or there is a threat to the
189 United States v. Hurtado, 47 F3d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1995) (harmless error when
defendant appeared in prison attire for only one day; evidence of guilt overwhelming; and district court offered to give curative instruction, which defendant rejected).
See also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F3d 734, 747 (9th Cir. 1995) ("prison clothing cannot be considered inherently prejudicial when the jury already knows, based upon
other facts, that the defendant has been deprived of his liberty").
190 Holbrook, 475 US at 568-569.
191 Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 337 (1970).
192 Id. at 343. A judge has an obligation to maintain courtroom decorum in other
ways. For example, failing to take action when a witness on the stand ingested drugs
in open view of some jurors constituted "a serious abdication of [the judge's] responsibility to maintain order and to control the proceedings." United States v. Van
Meerbeke, 548 F2d 415 (2d Cir. 1976).
193 Allen, 397 US at 344. Some appellate courts require that the trial judge pursue
less restrictive alternatives before imposing physical restraints. See Castillo v. Stainer,
983 F2d 145, 147-148 (9th Cir. 1992).
194 Hellum v. Warden, 28 F3d 903 (8th Cir. 1994); Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F3d 49
(9th Cir. 1994); Brewster v. Bordenkircher, 745 F2d 913,915 (4th Cir. 1984); People
v. Rouse, 591 NE2d 1172 (NY 1992); People v. Bosket, 564 NYS2d 785 (NY App.
Div. 1990). A trial judge need not conduct an evidentiary hearing or make formal
findings before ordering that a defendant be shackled. See Morgan v. Bunnell, 24
F3d 49,52 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stewart, 20 F3d 911, 915 n.8 (8th Cir.
1994). However, the basis for the decision to shackle should be apparent from the
record. Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995); Helium v. Warden, 28
F3d 903,907 (8th Cir. 1994).
195 Helium, 28 F3d at 907.
196 Id. at 907; Morgan, 24 F3d at 49; United States v. Weeks, 919 F2d 248 (5th Cir.
1990); People v. Greiner, 549 NYS2d 831 (NY App. Div. 1989).
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safety and security of court personnel or spectators. 197 Shackling a defendant who is representing himself or herself poses special problems
about which the judge must inform the defendant. 198 Shackling a codefendant,199 or a defense witness,2oo is also within the judge's discretion. Courts make a distinction between a defendant's exposure to the
jury inside the courtroom under unusual conditions of restraint, and an
inadvertent exposure while under routine security restraints outside the
courtroom. 20l When shackling is used, judges should try to minimize
the potential for prejudice by employing restraints, that is, leg braces,
that can be hidden from the jury's view. 202
Gagging is allowed when the defendant poses a clear risk of disrupting the trial by making statements thal might impair the orderly
trial process. An order gagging a defendant was upheld after the defendant violated the judge's warning by blurting out that he had not been permitted to take a lie detector test, and that the government's main witness
was a convicted car thief.2° 3 When shackling or gagging is used, a curative
instruction sh uld be given that the l'I~straint has no bearing on the defendant's
guilt. 204 owever, when the defense fails to request an instruction, the judge
is under no obligation to give one sua sponte. 205

Coercing Witnesses
A judge may not coerce a witnes either to give testimony, or to
refrain from giving testimony. Due proces guarantees a criminal defendant the right to offer the testimony of witnes es to establish his
defense. 206 A judge's conduct in pre,suring defense witnesses not to
197 Helium, 28 F3d at 903; Morgan, 24 F3d at 49; Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F2d 492
(9th Cir. 1988); Bosket, 564 NYS2d at 785.
lUX Abdullah v. Groose, 44 F3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1995) ("once the court decided
to shackle him, tbe court made no effort to ascertain whether [defendant] understood
the effect shackling would have on his ability to represent himself').
1~9 State v. Brewer, 301 So. 2d 630 (La. 1974).
200 People v. Bryant, 551 NYS2d 612 (NY App. Div. 1990).
201 United States v. Moreno, 933 F2d 362 (6th Cir. 1991).
202 Helium, 28 F3d at 903; Weeks, 919 F2d at 248. Other ways to minimize prejudice include excusing the jury when the defendant walked to the witness stand. See
Morgan, 24 F3d at 52.
203 Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F2d 492, 495-496 (9th Cir. 1988).
204 Moreno, 933 F2d at 362; Stewart, 850 F2d at 492, 495-496; People v. Hart,
491 NYS2d 74 (NY App. Div. 1985).
205 Rouse, 591 NE2d at 1172.
206 Washington v. Texas, 388 US 14, 19 (1967).
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testify by admonishing them about the consequences of giving false
testimony can violate due process. Thus, in Webb v. Texas,207 the judge
gratuitously singled out the defendant's only witness with a lengthy
admonition on the dangers of perjury, and threatened him with severe
consequences if he lied, following which the witness refused to testify
and was excused. 208 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on due
process grounds. The Court found that the judge's strong-arm tactics
"could well have exerted such duress on the witness's mind as to preclude him from making a free and voluntary choice whether or not to
testify."209 The Court concluded that "the judge's threatening remarks,
directed only at a single witness for the defense, effectively drove that
witness off the stand."210
However, judges have discretion to warn witnesses about the possibility of incriminating themsel ves by giving perj ured testimony. 211 Thus,
discussing the consequences of giving perjured testimony with a potential defense witness is not necessarily improper, particularly when
the judge has a legitimate basis for believing that the witness might

Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95 (1972).
208 The judge admonished the witness as follows:
207

Now you have been called down a Q witness in this case by the Defendant. It
is the Court 's duty to admonish you that you don'r have to te ·tify, that anything
you say can be used against you. If you toke the witness stand and lie under oath,
the Court will personally see that y ur case goe L the grand jury and you will be
indicted for perjury and the liklibood (sic) is that you would get convicted of
perjury and lhat it wou ld be stacked onto what you have already gol., so that is the
matter you have gotto make up your mind on. U you gelon the witness stand and
lie, it is probably going to mean several years and at least more time that you are
going to have to serve. It will also be held again ·t you in the penitentiary when
you're up for parole and the Coun wants you to Lhoroughly untlerstand Lbe chances
you re taking by getting on lhat witness stand under oath. You may teU the truth
and if you do, that is aU right, but if you lie you ca n get into real trouble. The court
wants you to know that. You don't owe anybody anything to testify and it must be
done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know
the hazard you are taking.
Id. at 95-96.
209 Id. at 98.
l lo ld. See aJso Anderson v. W~u'den, Md. Penitentiary, 696 F2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982)
Gudge "openly and successfully pressed defelld~tnt's two key witnesses to change
their testimony"); Berg v. Morris, 483 F. Supp. 179 (ED Cal. L980) Gudge clearly
indicated disbelief in witness's testjmony and Ulreatened witness with perjury and
parole revocation) . Although the Court in Webb rever 'ed the conviction without discussing the prejudjcial effect of the loss of the defense witness, subsequent ea es
clearly h ld that harmless error analysi is required for Webh violations.
211 United States v. Smith, 997 F2d 674, 680 (10th Cir. \993); United States v.
Arthur, 949 F2d 211, 215 (6th Cif. 199]).
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commit perj ury. 212 Of course, distinguishing proper concern from improper
intimidation is not easy. Even the conscientious judge must be careful lest
his or her comments become so inlimidaling that they create a real possibility that the witness's decisjon not to testify was based on the judge's
coercive language rather than on the witness's own voluntary choice.213
Nor may ajudge coerce a witne s into giving testimony. Occasional
admonishments to a reluctant witness are proper.214
Moreover, ajudge is empowered to order testimony from a witness
who has been granted immunity.215 However, a judge may not use the
contempt power, or his or her sentencin g authority as pretexts to coerce witnesses into giving favorable testimony for the government. 216
Similarly, a judge comments to a defendant tbat her only chance of acquittal is to take the stand and te tify 'went too far," and in any event
should have been directed to defense counsel. 217 Nevertheless, a reviewing
court will examine the record to determine whether such coercive remarks
deprived the witness of the free will to make a voluntary decision. 218

Failing to Sequester Witnesses
The sequestering of witnesses has existed since Biblical times 219
and serves two purposes: it "exercises a restraint on witnesses' 'tailor21 2 United States v. Simmons, 670 2d 365, 368- 369 (DC Cir. 1982) ("Webb thus
holds that a defendant is denied due process of law when a trial judge, without any
basis in the record to conclude that u witness might lie. sua sp nte admonishes the
defendant's only wjt:ne S • . . and lhereby discourages the witness from testifying");
Reese v. United States, 467 A2d 152 (DC App. 1983) Gudge s perjury remarks based
on witness's plan to recant grand jury testimony that defendant confessed to the
crime).
213 Yates v. United States, 513 A2d 818 (DC App. 1986) (conviction affinned in a
"close case" despite judge's unnecessarily repetitive and emphatic remarks that caused
witness to change his testimony).
214 Gaston v. Hunter, Ariz. 588 P2d 326 (1978).
215 Kastigar v. United States, 406 US 441. 448-459 (1972).
216 United Stales v. Giraldo. 822 F2d 205 (2c1 Cir. 1987) Gudge's threatening witness with civil contempt and severe entencc "subvert[ed] botb the proper purposes
of sentencing for criminal offenses and the temporal limitations on civil contempt
sanctions"; nevertheless, no prejudice to defendant was proved).
217 United States v. Goodwin, 770 F2d 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (although judge's remarks "came very close to resulting in improper coercion," defendant's decision to
testify apparently voluntary and any error harmless).
2IK rd . Sec United States v. Hoffman. 832 F2d 1299. I 03 (1st Cir. 1987) (requiring 'some l)luusible nexus" between the challenged conduct and the witness's decisi n); United States v. Crawford, 707 F2d 447.449 CLOth ir. 1983) (test is whether
conduct sub ·tantially interfered with witness's decision).
219 Government of Virgin Is. v. Edinborough, 625 F2d 472, 473 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980).
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ing' their testimony to that of earlier witnesses, and it aids in detecbng
testimony that is less than candid."220 Modern statutes make sequestration a matter of right rather than a matter commilted to the trial judge's
discretion. 221 Although statutes typically limit coverage to the physical
boundaries of the courtroom, in effect affording parties only the right to
close the courtroom to prospective witnesses,222 judges retain considerable discretion to enter much broader orders that may include sequestration of witnesses before, during, and after their testimony,223 entering
nondiscussion orders,224 and compelling parties to present witnesses in
a prescribed sequence.225
Sequestration rules also provide for exemptions, and a judge has
discretion to determine whether a witness or witnesses may be exempted
from the rule. 226 Such exemptions frequently involve government agents
who have assisted the prosecution in developing the case. 227 Among the
factors relevant to the exercise of discretion are the importance of the
United States v. Geders, 425 US 80, 87 (1976) .
United States v. Jackson , 60 F3d 128, 134-135 (2d Cir. 1995) ("strong presumption in favor of sequestration"). See also State v. Omechinski, 468 SE2d 173,
177 (W. Va. 1996) (rule also applies to rebuttal witnesses) . The mandatory language
of modern sequestration statutes is illustrated by Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which states:
220

22 1

At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its
own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (I) a party who is a natural
person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person
designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is
shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
Many states continue to leave sequestration to the trial judge's discretion. See,
e.g., RIR Evid. 615 .
222 But see United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 373, 376 (10th Cir. 1986) (circumvention of rule occurs when parties indirectly defeat its purpose by discussing their
testimony with other witnesses who are to testify) .
mUnitedStatesv.Sepulveda,15F3d 1161, 1176 (lstCir. 1993).
224 Id. at 1176 ("non-discussion orders are generally thought to be a standard
concomitant of basic sequestration fare"); United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 373,
376 (10th Cir. 1986) (nondiscussion component implicit in rule); State v. Omechinski,
468 SE2d at 178 ("in addition to instructing the witnesses to leave the courtroom,
the judge should instruct them not to discuss the case").
225 Sepulveda, 15 F3d at 1176.
226 Compare Jackson, 60 F3d at 128, 134-135 (allowing three case agents to remain in the courtroom at prosecutor's table may be permissible) with United States
v. Ramirez, 963 F2d 693 (5th Cir. 1992) (assumption that judge abused discretion in
allowing more than one case agent to remain in courtroom).
227 Jackson, 60 F3d at 128, 134-135 (exempting three case agents not necessarily
abuse of discretion); Ramirez, 963 F2d at 693 (allowing two case agents to remain in
courtroom assumed to constitute abuse of discretion) .
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testimony; whether it will involve controverted facts; whether the information is ordinarily subject to tailoring such that cross-examination
could expose deficiencies; the extent that the testimony will encompass the same issues as that of other witnesses; the order in which the
witnesses will testify; any potential bias that might motivate the witness's
testimony; and whether the witness's presence is essential or merely
desirable. 228 Errors typically associated with sequestration include a
judge's failure to give witnesses appropriate nondiscussion instructions,229 exclusion of evidence that a witness violated the sequestration
order,230 and ajudge's failure to order witnesses to leave the courtroom. 23 I
A court may impose various sanctions for a violation of sequestration, including holding the offending party in contempt, permitting crossexamination concerning the violation, and precluding the witness from
testifying. 232 Disqualifying a witness from testifying should not be lightly
imposed, and it is usually an abuse of discretion to preclude testimony
unless the defendant or the defendant's counsel has cooperated in the
violation. 233 Declaring a mistrial is also within a court's discretion. 234
Any error in administering sequestration is subject to a showing of
prejudice.235 Courts differ as to which party has the burden on the issue
of prejudice. Several courts require the party aggrieved by the sequestration error to demonstrate prejudice. 236 Other courts place the burden
on the prosecution to prove that the error was harmless on the theory

Jackson, 60 F3d at 135.
229 United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 373 (lOth Cir. 1986); Omechinski, 468
SE2d at 173.
230 Childress v. State, 467 SE2d 865 (Ga. 1996) (reversible error after one witness
attempted to influence testimony of another witness who had not yet testified).
231 Solomon v. State, 913 SW2d 288 (Ark. 1996) Uudge commits reversible error
in allowing prosecution witnesses to remain in courtroom).
232 United States v. Hobbs, 31 F3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Eyster, 948 F2d 1196, 1211 (llth Cir. 1991).
233 Hobbs, 31 F3d at 921; Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F2d 1148, 1157 (5th Cir.
1972).
234 United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F3d 1507, 1511 (lOth Cir. 1994) (mistrial
considered a "rather drastic remedy"). See also United States v. Womack, 654 F2d
1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981).
235 Jackson, 60 F3d at 136 (citing cases from other circuits).
236 United States v. Sykes, 977 F2d 1242, 1245 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Ramirez, 963 F2d 693, 704 (5th Cir. 1992); Government of Virgin Is. v. Edinborough,
625 F2d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 1980); Solomon v. State, 913 SW2d at 290-291.
228
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that it probably is impossible to tell how a witness's testimony would
have differed had there been compliance with the rule. 237
"Sandbagging" Counsel

A judge frequently makes trial rulings on which defense counsel
relies. For example, a judge might represent to counsel that he or she
will instruct the jury on a particular legal theory, or allow a party to
introduce evidence or examine a witness at a future point in the trial, or,
in a bench trial, make a credibility determination concerning a witness.
Counsel in such a case should be able to rely on the judge's representations, and might reasonably formulate subsequent trial strategy based
on those assurances. 238 However, if the judge later reverses his or her
position, and takes no steps to avoid prejudice, he or she can deprive a
party of a fair trial.
That precise situation occurred in United States v. MendeP39 when,
during a bench conference, the judge stated to defense counsel that he
did not find a government witness's testimony reliable. However, following summations, the judge changed his position and indicated that
the witness was indeed credible in certain respects. Defense counsel
had relied on the judge's earlier credibility announcement by forgoing
submission of evidence that would have impeached the witness. A
motion for a mistrial was denied, but the Second Circuit reversed the
conviction, observing, "It cannot be said that a criminal trial was fair
when the judge in mid-trial announced that certain testimony will not
be credited and then without warning based a conviction in major part
on that very testimony."240

237 Jackson, 60 F3d at 128; United States v. Pulley, 922 F2d 1283, 1286 (6th Cir.
1991); United States v. Farnham, 791 F2d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 1986); Omechinski, 468
SE2d at 180-181.
238 Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the district judge
to inform counsel of which instruction are going to be given in order to allow counsel to argue the case intelligently to the jury. A violation of this rule is reversible
conduct if it prejudices the defendant. See United States v. Gaskins, 849 F2d 454
(9th Cir. 1988) (giving supplemental instruction concerning aiding and abetting in
response to jury note, after advising counsel that it would not do so, reversible conduct).
239 United States v. Mendel, 746 F2d 155 (2d Cir. 1984).
4
2 oId. at 163. See also United States v. Ienco, 92 F3d 564 (7th eir. 1960) (prejudicial errorfor judge to announce during prosecution's case in chief that il would not
give a Pinkerton .instruction. and then after both sides completed examining witnesses changed his mind and said he would give such an instruction).
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In a similar situation ajudge advised defense counsel that his crossexamination of government witnesses regarding bias and illicit motive
in their preparation of tape recordings and transcripts would have to
await the defense case. 241 When the defense commenced its case, the
judge again denied counsel the opportunity to question these witnesses
because "he could well have done that on his earlier cross-examination
of the agents." The Second Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that
the trialjudge's about-face in effect "sandbagged" defense counsel into
forgoing defense option. A similar about-face resulted in reversible
error when the judge, after assuring defense counsel that he would instruct the jury on a particular legal theory, and after counsel gave a
closing argument premised on that assurance, reversed himself and refused to give that instruction. 242
Conclusion

A linchpin of the criminal justice system is the ability of defense
counsel to represent a client effectively. The trial judge's conduct can
hamper defense counsel's performance either by remarks that denigrate
or threaten counsel, rulings that undermine effective representation, or
other conduct that communicates to the jury the judge'S disposition either to favor the prosecution or to disfavor the defense. The judge's
behavior, in the various contexts described earlier, has the potential to
seriously impair defense counsel's ability to represent the client effectively, and thereby prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.
United States v. Salerno, 937 F2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991).
2<12 People v. Greene, 553 NE2d 1014 (NY 1990). See also United States v. Gaskins,
849 F2d 454 (9th Cir. 1988) (improper to give supplemental instruction concerning
particular lega] theory after assuring defense counsel that it would not do so).
241
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